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Dogs and Servants 
Every time I watch The Wizard of Oz I worry about the fate of Toto. Oh, 
I know he’s going back to Kansas with Dorothy, I’ve seen the film a 
hundred times. And I don’t worry that Dorothy will be stuck in Oz, or the 
Scarecrow will go up in flames. So why do I have this intense emotional 
response to Toto every time he disappears from the screen, especially 
when he’s snatched up by the Wicked Witch’s flying monkeys? 
Anticipating your possible reaction to this pathetic confession, I summon 
Donna Haraway to my defense. Writing on the highly emotional scenes 
of parting between master and dog on the TV show Cell Dog, she 
threatens: “I dare you to be cynical, even if all the knives of critical 
discourse are in your hands” (When Species Meet 65). Yes, I admit it, I 
have a knee-jerk response to Toto, yet I’m not normally sentimental. So 
why? I think I feel so strongly because if Toto were lost, I can’t follow 
him, I can’t put myself in his place. Not that I can imagine myself a 
flaming scarecrow, but Scarecrow talks. He has consciousness, if not a 
brain, and thus he can be the center of consciousness. Toto cannot, which 
makes him more vulnerable, perhaps, more deserving of my empathic 
response, while at the same time foreign, so absolutely “other.” To put it 
in the common parlance of the literature classroom, I identify so strongly 
with Toto precisely because I can’t identify with him. I am woman, Toto 
is dog.
Just six years before Victor Fleming’s classic film, Virginia Woolf 
published her popular novel—a Book-of-the-Month Club selection in the 
U.S.—Flush, based on the life of Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s cocker 
spaniel as narrated in the Brownings’ letters. Reading those letters, 
Woolf responded so strongly to the figure of the dog that she “couldn’t 
resist making him a life,” she wrote (L5 162). Woolf too responded so 
intensely to the dog, I want to suggest, because she could not—indeed, 
would not—identify with him. Still, Quentin Bell’s delightful and often-
quoted remark that Flush is not so much a novel by someone who loved 
dogs as a novel by someone who wanted to be a dog, is apropos here. 
Just what kind of identification is this, this empathic response, to quote 
Jacques Derrida writing on his encounter with a cat, in the face of the 
“absolute alterity of the neighbor,” or companion species (360)? 
I am interested in the relationship between dogs and domestic servants in 
Woolf’s novel. As Marianne DeKoven writes in her PMLA guest column 
on animal studies, many scholars use “nonhuman” animals because they 
are “motivated by the parallels between animals and subjugated human 
beings” (363), such as domestic servants.1 In Flush, parallels abound. 
Both dog and servant are severed from family ties. Flush must part, 
wrenchingly, from Miss Mitford in being given as a gift to Miss Barrett. 
A door shut. For one instant he paused, bewildered, unstrung. Then 
with a pounce as of clawed tigers, memory fell upon him. He felt 
himself alone—deserted. He rushed to the door. It was shut. He 
pawed, he listened. He heard footsteps descending. He knew them for 
the familiar footsteps of his mistress. […] Miss Mitford was slowly, 
was heavily, was reluctantly descending the stairs. And as she went, 
1 My initial writing on Flush focused on the function this popular novel performs 
in Woolf’s canon. I read Flush as the excess of a canonical theory of value that 
sets up distinctions between good and bad literature, high art and popular fiction, 
providing us instead with a noneconomical, or noncanonical, theory of value 
(Caughie 145).
[…] panic seized upon him. Door after door shut in his face as Miss 
Mitford went downstairs; they shut on freedom; on fields; on hares; 
on grass; on his adored, his venerated mistress […] on all he had 
known of happiness and love and human goodness! There! The front 
door slammed. He was alone. She had deserted him. (Flush 21-22)
Likewise, Lily Wilson, Miss Barrett’s maid, would have parted from her 
family in going into service, though no emotional scenes of parting are 
narrated, and she had to part from her fiancé in following Miss Barrett to 
Italy. Both dog and servant are bound to their mistress through affective 
ties and familial intimacy. So strong is that bond that Lily elopes to Italy 
with her mistress just as Flush, out of love for Miss Barrett, conquers 
his biting jealousy of Robert Browning. Both dog and servant, at least 
in London, are restricted to confined domestic spaces: for Flush, Miss 
Barrett’s back bedroom, for Lily, Mr. Barrett’s house on “the most 
august of London streets,” Wimpole Street—a house first described in 
terms of the dress and rituals of its servants (16-17). Such confinement, 
moreover, marks their status as property. Donna Haraway remarks 
that the nineteenth-century bourgeois family invented the practice of 
middle-class pet keeping, and Woolf notes that had Lily not gone to Italy 
with Miss Barrett, she would have been “turned into the street before 
sunset” (170). In another Woolf novel, The Years, Crosby, the old family 
housekeeper, is “identified with […] the furniture she spends her life 
polishing,” as Alison Light says in Mrs. Woolf and the Servants, and is 
described as “following Eleanor about the house like a dog” (71). Dogs 
and servants are faithful (185). Like dogs, Light remarks, “servants 
belonged to another species” (141). Cross-species identification is 
evident in Woolf’s personal writings on domestic servants as well. In her 
diaries and letters, she describes her domestic Lily as having “charming, 
stupid, doglike eyes” (Light 133), and Lottie “works like a horse” (Light 
142). At one point, in frustration with Lottie, she writes, “Considering 
their unimportance they must be compared to flies in the eye for the 
discomfort they can produce in spite of being so small” (D1 197). 
As I pursued the many parallels between dog and servant, I kept coming 
back to a remark a student made about this novel in what my graduate 
students have dubbed my “class on class.” Isn’t it interesting, Erin said, 
sardonically, that Woolf can get into the mind of a dog but not the mind 
of a servant. Certainly, as I have written elsewhere, Woolf does seem to 
have trouble getting into the heads of domestics: 
Visions of joy there must have been at the wash-tub, say with her 
children, […] at the public-house, drinking; turning over scraps in 
her drawers. Some cleavage of the dark there must have been, some 
channel in the depths of obscurity through which light enough issued 
to twist her face grinning in the glass and make her, turning to her job 
again, mumble out the old music hall song. (TTL 131)
So writes Woolf of Mrs. McNab, the woman who cleans and tends the 
Ramsays’ summer home in To the Lighthouse. Similarly, the biographer-
narrator of Flush appends a note on the “extremely obscure” life of Lily 
Wilson. “Since she spoke almost as seldom as Flush,” writes the narrator, 
“the outlines of her character are little known” (169). Echoing the earlier 
novel, the passage continues:
Then Mrs. Browning had died—there can have been no lack of 
thoughts in Wilson’s old head as she sat at the window […]. But 
nothing can be more vain than to pretend that we can guess what 
they were, for she was typical of the great army of her kind—the 
inscrutable, the all-but-silent, the all-but-invisible servant maids of 
history. (174)
At first it seems contemptible—or at the very least, remarkable—that 
Woolf can get into a dog’s head but not a servant’s, as if she were 
indifferent to the latter’s visions of joy or daily sufferings. For all 
Woolf’s empathy with outsiders and her pleas for writers to give us 
the “lives of the obscure” so that we might bridge the class divide, and 
despite her lament in Three Guineas that the Dictionary of National 
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Biography contains no lives of maids, for, as she writes in Flush, 
“biography had not then cast its searchlight so low” (170), Woolf, 
it seems, is far better able—not to mention more willing—to write 
from the perspective of a cocker spaniel than of a serving woman. 2 
Why? Rather than exposing her insensitivity to servants (for which 
there is ample evidence in her diaries and letters), I want to explore 
the conventions of proximity and identification in Woolf’s writing 
about dogs and domestics. What different modality of identification is 
operating in the representation of dogs and servants in Flush? Or in my 
response to Toto?
If, as animal studies scholars argue, in writing about animals we are to 
resist making the dog a person, thereby making the animal a figure for 
the self, why would it be possible, or what could it mean, to make the 
person a dog? In his chapter on Gertrude Stein in Cruising Modernism, 
Michael Trask writes of Stein’s use of dogs and their importance to 
the “making” of persons. Dogs, like servants, play a supporting role, 
subordinate yet essential, especially for anchoring “mobile persons” 
(75) in a rapidly fragmenting society. The increasing demand for 
domestic servants in response to an ever-expanding middle class, writes 
Light, came at the very time live-in service was on the wane (179-80). 
Employer and servant alike now wore the same clothing styles, attended 
the same cinemas, voted for the same political party, and listened to that 
great leveling device, the BBC. Those who are “in danger of sliding 
out of place,” Trask writes, are “in dire need of the categorical fastness 
that dogs [and, I would add, servants] […] exemplify” (75). Thus the 
domestic dog, “at once obedient and misbehaving, faithful and straying” 
(76), he says, becomes a figure for the contradiction of modernity: an 
imperative to obedience within a social system that was fragmenting. 
Dogs as “modern subjects,” writes Haraway, require “self-rewarding 
discipline from legitimate authority” (64). Similarly, Light says that dogs 
“embodied the Victorian past with their ready capacity to obey authority 
and respond to discipline” (50), much like servants. “In her clean white 
apron and cap,” Light remarks, “the servant kept all kinds of disorder at 
bay” (82).3 
Woolf’s novel Flush exemplifies as well modernity’s desire to control 
behavior, exposing the “categorical fastness” (Trask 75) that a 
fragmenting society desires. Comparing canine and human aristocracies, 
Woolf’s narrator finds the canine much superior because the Spaniel 
Club establishes definitive signs of good breeding based on ears, eyes, 
noses, and coats. Curled ears, a light nose, or a topknot are, the narrator 
tells us, “nothing less than fatal” (6). Distinctions in human society 
are far less definitive: a coat of arms may be forged, an income may 
be earned, and coats can be bought off the rack. Throughout the novel 
Woolf has Flush learn to make distinctions, to draw boundaries. In the 
city, he must be led on a chain; in the countryside, he may run free. In 
London he must curb his sexual instincts, in Florence he can indulge 
them. In London he drinks from a purple jar, in Florence he eats off 
the street. In Wimpole street all dogs are purebreds, in Pisa they are 
mongrels. Such distinctions in the novel are explicitly class distinctions. 
Indeed, it is Flush’s dognapping that leads Barrett to the London 
slums to see firsthand the lives of others bordering on her own genteel 
neighborhood. For Woolf, dogs, like servants, “exist on the margins,” 
in the proximate social spaces both Stein (Trask 79) and Woolf seek to 
narrate. In narrating these spaces, Woolf discovers that dogs play an 
important role in negotiating the problem of identification in modernist 
writing. By making the person a dog, establishing an identification 
between dogs and servants, Woolf discovers a way out of the double 
bind of the modernist writer who would write across class lines without 
2 So too Barrett Browning could write about Flush but not about Lily, as the 
narrator remarks in a passing phrase that “since Miss Barrett never wrote a poem 
about her,” we don’t know Lily (169). 
3 Writing on Lily in her long note, the narrator wonders how she came to be 
Barrett Browning’s maid, whether perhaps she had become known to the Barretts’ 
cook “by the decency of her demeanor and the cleanliness of her apron” (168).
making her character—whether Lily Wilson or Mrs. McNab—a 
representative figure of the working classes. 
Trask asserts that behaviorists and evolutionary biologists of Woolf’s day 
were blurring the lines between animal and human behavior to establish 
a “natural” model of subjectivity. But Woolf, significantly, keeps animal 
and human distinct. Woolf gently satirizes precisely this behaviorist 
psychology in the scene after the emotional parting, where Flush and 
Miss Barrett gaze into each other’s eyes for the first time: 
Each was surprised. Heavy curls hung down on either side of Miss 
Barrett’s face; large bright eyes shone out; a large mouth smiled. 
Heavy ears hung down on either side of Flush’s face; his eyes, too, 
were large and bright: his mouth was wide. There was a likeness 
between them. As they gazed at each other each felt: Here am I—and 
then each felt: But how different! […] Broken asunder, yet made in 
the same mould, could it be that each completed what was dormant in 
the other? (23)
This is the kind of sympathetic identification Woolf deflates. Instead, 
Woolf emphasizes the world of difference between canine and human: 
“But no. Between them lay the widest gulf that can separate one being 
from another. She spoke. He was dumb. She was woman; he was dog” 
(23).
Woolf keeps the canine and the human distinct for good reason. For 
the social spaces Woolf seeks to narrate are at once as proximate and 
as remote as the canine’s world of smells: “Where Mrs. Browning saw, 
[Flush] smelt; where she wrote, he snuffed”: 
Here, then, the biographer must perforce come to a pause. Where two 
or three thousand words are insufficient for what we see […] there 
are no more than two words and perhaps one-half for what we smell. 
The human nose is practically non-existent. The greatest poets in the 
world have smelt nothing but roses on the one hand, and dung on the 
other. The infinite gradations that lie between are unrecorded. Yet it 
was in the world of smell that Flush mostly lived. (129-30)
I want to suggest that Flush models precisely the kind of writing 
needed to enter into those social spaces, the manifold and shifting social 
spaces between the classes, and to respond to “the absolute alterity of 
the neighbor” (Derrida 380). Imagining life from a dog’s perspective 
provides a view—or a sniff—from the margin without having to identify 
with that position—an identification that is always discomforting if 
ever really possible. It provides what I have termed an ethics without 
identification.
In When Species Meet, Haraway provides a clue to the alternative 
reading of dogs and servants I’m suggesting here: “we might nurture 
responsibility with and for animals better by plumbing the category of 
labor more than the category of rights” (73). The category of rights is 
based on an assumption of similarity between positions that are not only 
not symmetrical, but that necessarily entail the use of one another’s 
bodies (79)—as fleas use Flush’s body, as the Brownings use Lily’s. So 
when we read “visions of joy there must have been,” we needn’t see 
this as a refusal to respond but as a refusal to identify. The assumption 
that in refusing to identify with servants, Woolf fails to give them their 
due is based on a notion of rights structured by a larger economy of the 
law. And here I turn to one final text that explores the boundary between 
animal and human: Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak’s “Three Women’s 
Texts and a Critique of Imperialism.” Writing about the violence done 
in trying to bring the so-called Third World Other into the circuit of the 
law, as Victor Frankenstein does with his monster, or Charlotte Brontë 
does with Bertha, the madwoman in the attic, Spivak writes that their 
failure to do so “reminds us that the absolutely Other cannot be selfed” 
(850). Not writing from the Other’s point of view, not making the Other 
speak, can itself be a responsible act, a response to the “absolute alterity 
of the neighbor.” In fact, a writer in Woolf’s position, a member of the 
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middle-class who employed domestics, cannot turn the servant-other 
into a self without violence. To quote Spivak again, “the project of 
imperialism has always already historically refracted what might have 
been the absolutely Other into a domesticated Other that consolidates the 
imperialist self” (846)—or the middle-class self. Domestic service, like 
imperialism, is a “territorial and subject-constituting project,” entailing 
a “violent deconstruction” of oppositions between human and animal, 
speech and silence, freedom and bondage (843). Writing on Derrida’s 
essay, “The Animal that I Therefore Am,” Haraway commends him for 
rejecting the “facile and basically, if generally well-intentioned, move of 
claiming to see from the point of view of the other” (21). In forbidding 
himself to assign meaning onto the cat, by insisting the cat is a real cat 
and not a metaphor, Derrida asks, “must I conversely give in to the other 
violence or stupidity, that which would consist in suspending one’s 
compassion and in depriving the animal of every power of manifestation 
[…]?” (387). Clearly not, as Woolf shows in that highly charged scene of 
parting described above.
It’s not, I would argue, that Woolf’s writing about servants does 
no political or ethical work insofar as she remains distant from the 
servant’s interior; it’s that it doesn’t do the work we may want, the 
work that sustains our sense of self, that makes us feel good because 
we can sympathize with the other. An ethics without identification does 
work, though, as a way of negotiating proximate social spaces, and the 
alternative between, to quote Derrida, “a projection that appropriates and 
an interruption that excludes” (388). If, as Haraway argues, the category 
of labor provides a model for writing about dogs without giving them an 
identity (that is, dogs are not analogous to wage laborers), then animal 
studies might provide a model for writing about domestic servants 
that requires a response to, but not an identification with, that subject 
position. When Alison Light says that dogs appear in Woolf’s writings 
“as a stand-in for that other dogsbody, the servant” (50), we need not 
take that as a commentary on Woolf’s scandalous view of servants, but 
as a clue as to how to read her modernist project of writing across class 
lines. 
 Pamela L. Caughie 
 Loyola University Chicago
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Here Ends the Special Issue on  
Virginia Woolf and Animals
Truly Miscellaneous
hhhhhhh
Dr. Jekyll and Mrs. Hyde Park Gate:  
Echoes of Robert Louis Stevenson in Mrs. Dalloway
A writer, plumbing the cavernous depths of the human psyche, 
explores in an experimental “phenomenon of style” (Nabokov 184) the 
“competing tugs of the conscious and the unconscious, […] the life-
denying Thanatos principle and the life-enhancing Eros” (McLynn 262) 
and invents two separate characters who share, enigmatically, one self. 
The text described here is Robert Louis Stevenson’s Strange Case of 
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, but the portrayal lends itself just as easily to 
Virginia Woolf’s Mrs. Dalloway. While Woolf and Stevenson are far 
too dissimilar to share much common space in modern literary studies, 
striking echoes nonetheless resonate between these London novels, 
particularly in their treatment of literary doubles and their parallel scenes 
of transformation and suicide.
Virginia Woolf’s early journals reveal her fascination with Stevenson. 
A 1905 diary entry provides a glimpse of her running “Out to Hatchards 
to buy Stevenson and Pater,” seeking the essays “not to copy, I hope, 
but to see how the trick’s done” (Passionate Apprentice 251). Woolf’s 
father, Sir Leslie Stephen, an “eminent Victorian” in his own right, may 
have helped inspire his daughter’s early interests. Sir Leslie had known 
Stevenson long before Virginia arrived; born a generation before Woolf 
in 1850, Stevenson was a literary acquaintance of Stephen. Biographer 
Frank McLynn gives Stephen, as editor of the Cornhill Magazine, a 
special position in Stevenson’s career as advisor and mentor, writing 
that “Before the 1880s, Leslie Stephen […] was the only man in Britain 
of editorial status to be certain of Louis’s genius” (101). Stephen 
encouraged and published some of Stevenson’s early works, including 
a significant essay on Victor Hugo that Stevenson later felt “marked 
[…] the beginning of his command of style” (Graham Balfour qtd. 
in McLynn 102) and one of his first notable short stories, “Will o’ the 
Mill,” in 1879 (McLynn 139).1 Woolf echoes her father’s sentiments by 
glimpsing in Stevenson seeds of literary genius worth cultivating.2 
Woolf’s keen affinity for Stevenson did not last, however. Though she 
once admired Stevenson’s essays, she later offers only lukewarm praise 
of his fiction. In “Phases of Fiction” (1929), Woolf favors Stevenson’s 
works over those of Sir Walter Scott in her discussion of the Romantics, 
writing that “any page of The Master of Ballantrae […] still stands 
wear and tear; but the fabric of The Bride of Lammermoor is full of 
holes and patches” (67). She admires Stevenson’s knack for storytelling 
and his artful treatment of romance, admitting that passages of his are 
“lovely and brilliant” (68) taken alone, though she feels unsatisfied by 
1 We also have Sir Leslie Stephen to thank, indirectly, for one of the most famous 
literary characters of all time, since he introduced Stevenson to writer William 
Ernest Henley, whose amputated leg made him the inspiration for Long John 
Silver in Treasure Island.
2 Stevenson’s personal history, as the son and grandson of lighthouse designers, 
might have held additional interest for Woolf. In fact, Robert Louis Stevenson’s 
only writing for the Scottish Society of Arts was “a paper on a proposed new 
device to make lighthouse lights flash” (Harman 3). The Stevenson family 
designed several lighthouses on the Isle of Skye, where Woolf’s 1927 novel To 
the Lighthouse takes place. Indeed, when I read of the stocking Mrs. Ramsay 
is knitting for the Lighthouse keeper’s “little boy, who was threatened with 
a tuberculous hip” (TTL 5), I think of Stevenson, who was a sickly little boy 
thought to suffer from tuberculosis.
